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REDEFINING EN BANC REVIEW IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
Alexandra Sadinsky*
Every circuit has the ability to review cases en banc. Hearing cases en
banc allows the full circuit court to overturn a decision reached by a threejudge panel. Due to the decreasing probability of U.S. Supreme Court
intervention, the circuit court is often the court of last resort in the ordinary
life of a case, thereby amplifying the importance of en banc review. Despite
its significance, many critics contend that en banc review is inefficient and
rarely granted.
Each circuit has enacted its own rules governing en banc procedure.
These rules have both slight and significant differences from one another
and from Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, which governs all of the
circuits’ en banc review procedures. Because of the lack of uniformity
across the circuits, the proper application of Rule 35 is unclear.
This Note proposes to change the current en banc landscape by altering
the method in which a court will make the decision to sit en banc. This
Note suggests that petitions for en banc review should only be raised by
judges sua sponte, and the decision of whether to sit en banc should be
affirmatively voted on by a lower number of active-duty judges than is now
required under the simple majority rule.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1988, a jury convicted Gregory Wilson of murder, kidnapping, rape,
robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery.1 Wilson’s trial has been
regarded as “one of the worst examples . . . of the unfairness and abysmal
lawyering that pervade capital trials,” with commentators noting that his
“defense was clearly a charade” and that he was “sentenced to death in a
kangaroo court.”2
Wilson’s case began with a handwritten note from the trial judge begging
for a lawyer to represent Wilson.3 The handwritten note, posted on the
courtroom door, read: “PLEASE HELP. DESPERATE. THIS CASE
CANNOT BE CONTINUED AGAIN.”4 While the judge found two
lawyers to represent Wilson, it was soon clear that neither was competent.5
One lawyer had never tried a felony case.6 The other was a “‘semi-retired’

1. See Wilson v. Rees, 620 F.3d 699, 700 (6th Cir. 2010).
2. See Wilson v. Rees, 624 F.3d 737, 739, 741 (6th Cir. 2010) (Martin, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc); see also Andrew Wolfson, Kentucky Death-Row Inmate’s
Trial Littered with Problems, COURIER-J., Sept. 8, 2010, at A1.
3. See Wilson, 624 F.3d at 739.
4. See id.
5. See Wolfson, supra note 2.
6. See id.
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lawyer who volunteered to serve as lead counsel for free” and had no office,
staff, copy machine, or law books.7 The case was referred to as “a ‘travesty
of justice’ and among the worst examples . . . of a defendant tried for his
life with unqualified counsel.”8 Additionally, extreme bias undermined the
fairness of Wilson’s trial: Wilson’s co-defendant, who testified against
Wilson, was having sexual relations with the trial judge’s colleague
throughout the duration of Wilson’s trial.9 The jury sentenced Gregory
Wilson to death.10
Wilson appealed his judgment and sentence. The U.S. Supreme Court
denied certiorari on October 4, 1993, concluding direct review of his case.11
On November 21, 2007, Wilson filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the
Eastern District of Kentucky for injunctive relief.12 The § 1983 action
challenged the constitutionality of Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol
under the U.S. Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution.13 On
September 30, 2009, the district court dismissed with prejudice Wilson’s
complaint as time barred by Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations on
civil actions, which stipulates that the accrual date for method of execution
claims is the date of the conclusion of direct review.14 On September 3,
2010, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding, agreeing that
Wilson’s complaint was time barred.15
On September 3, 2010, Wilson petitioned the Sixth Circuit for rehearing
en banc (i.e., rehearing by the full appellate court).16 A poll was taken, and,
because less than a majority of the active judges favored doing so, en banc
review was denied.17 Sixth Circuit Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., however,
filed a vigorous dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc.18
Wilson’s case highlights the significance of en banc review.19 Gregory
Wilson was sentenced to death by the state trial court, denied certiorari by
the Supreme Court, and denied injunctive relief by the Sixth Circuit in part
because he was unable to get the Sixth Circuit to rehear his case en banc.
Although some of the active Sixth Circuit judges voted to rehear the case en
banc to reassess the Sixth Circuit’s rule that time barred his complaint, a
majority was not attained and, thus, Wilson’s case was not heard on the
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See Wilson, 624 F.3d at 738 (Martin, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
10. See Wilson v. Rees, 620 F.3d 699, 700 (6th Cir. 2010).
11. See Wilson v. Kentucky, 507 U.S. 1034, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 909 (1993).
12. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Wilson v. Rees, 3:07CV-00078 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 21, 2007), ECF No. 1.
13. See Wilson, 620 F.3d at 700.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 701.
16. See Wilson v. Rees, 624 F.3d 737, 738 (6th Cir. 2010).
17. See id.
18. See id. at 738–41 (Martin, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
19. The term “in banc” appeared in earlier versions of Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 35. See FED. R. APP. P. 35 (1967) (amended 2005). The rule currently uses the
term “en banc,” see id. R. 35 (2005), and the current spelling will be used throughout this
Note other than in quoted excerpts from other written works.
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merits. It is unclear which circuit judges voted to rehear Wilson’s case en
banc, as the circuits are not required to publish these votes.20 It is also
unclear why en banc review was denied, as the circuits similarly are not
required to provide their reasoning for denying review.21
En banc review gives every judge on a circuit court the opportunity to
review a decision announced by a three-judge panel. Because of the
discretionary nature of the writ of certiorari, very few cases are granted
review by the Supreme Court. Practically speaking, the courts of appeals
are the courts of last resort for the vast majority of cases.22 Despite the
significance of en banc review, the federal courts of appeals very rarely sit
en banc.23 En banc hearings consistently make up less than 1 percent of the
caseload of the federal circuit courts.24 In 2010, for example, en banc
decisions accounted for only 0.146 percent of the cases decided by the
federal circuit courts.25 In the Second Circuit, which grants the lowest
percentage of en banc petitions, en banc cases were only 0.03 percent of its
total docket in 2010.26
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure permits a case to be
heard or reheard en banc if so ordered by “[a] majority of the circuit judges
who are in regular active service.”27 Rule 35 warns, however, that an en
banc hearing or rehearing “is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered
unless: (1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain
uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a
question of exceptional importance.”28
Although Rule 35 seems straightforward, its application is anything but
clear. The determination of whether to grant review en banc has sparked
controversies between judges on the same court.29 Although en banc
review has a huge impact on a circuit court’s jurisprudence, as it is the
mechanism available for overruling precedent within a circuit,30 many

20. See Abigail Stecker, En Banc Revealed: Procedure, Politics, and Privacy 17 (Dec.
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/abigail_stecker/2/.
21. See Michael E. Solimine, Due Process and En Banc Decisionmaking, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 325, 326–30 (2006).
22. See infra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. See Michael E. Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REV. 29, 29–30
(1988).
25. See SECOND CIRCUIT COURTS COMM., EN BANC PRACTICES IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT:
TIME FOR A CHANGE? 5 (2011), available at http://www.federalbarcouncil.org/vg/custom/
uploads/pdfs/En_Banc_Report.pdf.
26. See id. at 4–5.
27. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2008) (denying rehearing en
banc). In Ricci, five separate opinions were published responding to the denial of rehearing
en banc. See id. at 88 (Calabresi, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 89
(Katzmann, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 90 (Parker, J., concurring
in the denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 92 (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc); id. at 93 (Cabranes, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
30. See Amy E. Sloan, The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Stealth Procedures and the Erosion
of Stare Decisis in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 713, 718–19 (2009).
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judges and scholars argue that the en banc procedure is a waste of judicial
resources; although almost all en banc petitions are denied, counsel
generally files them as a matter of course.31
There is little transparency in a circuit court’s decision to grant en banc
review, and little is known about why courts select certain cases for en banc
review while denying others. Generally, a case will be heard en banc only
if each of three conditions are met: (1) a litigant files a petition, or a judge
asks, for a hearing or rehearing en banc;32 (2) a judge in active service on
the circuit requests that the entire court be polled on the petition;33 and (3) a
majority of the judges in active service vote to grant the petition.34 Despite
the confusion surrounding the en banc procedure, one thing is perfectly
clear: en banc hearings and rehearings are rarely granted.35
Like most procedures in the federal courts, en banc procedures have their
positive and negative aspects.36 Unlike most others, however, en banc
procedure is often the subject of institutional derision by many circuit
judges and is a subject of exceptional controversy.37
This Note assesses the controversy over en banc procedure and the
various points of inconsistency among the circuit courts on whether, and
under what circumstances, to grant en banc review. Part I provides the
context for this discussion. Specifically, it discusses the history of the
federal court system and the initial debate over the en banc procedure. It
explores Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner,38 where the
Supreme Court first approved the en banc procedure. It also discusses
Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co.,39 where
the Court enunciated “certain fundamental [en banc] requirements [that]
should be observed by the Courts of Appeals.”40 Part I then explores
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 in greater detail and related federal
procedural rules which impact the decision to hear or rehear a case en banc.

While the federal courts of appeals and the Supreme Court are not bound by their own
opinions, they do not routinely disregard them. Id. at 717. “Horizontal stare decisis” refers
to the rule that courts conform to their own prior decisions. Id. at 717–18. Horizontal stare
decisis is not a requirement but, rather, a preferred policy that allows people to “know the
rules that govern their conduct to organize their lives, and basic fairness requires that
similarly situated parties be treated similarly.” Id. at 718. The circuit courts follow “the lawof-the-circuit rule” which implements the policy of horizontal stare decisis. Id. “The law of
the circuit rule provides that the decision of one panel is the decision of the court and binds
all future panels unless and until the panel’s opinion is reversed or overruled, either by the
circuit sitting en banc or the Supreme Court.” Id. at 718–19.
31. See Irving R. Kaufman, Do the Costs of the En Banc Proceeding Outweigh Its
Advantages?, 69 JUDICATURE 7, 57 (1985).
32. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(b); see also id. R. 35 advisory committee’s note.
33. See id. R. 35(f).
34. See id. R. 35(a).
35. See infra Part II.A.
36. See infra Part III.A–B.
37. See infra Part III.B.
38. 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
39. 345 U.S. 247 (1953).
40. Id. at 260.
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Part II provides a survey of the various en banc procedures the thirteen
circuit courts use. It analyzes the points where the circuits differ on the
question of when to grant en banc review. Specifically, Part II examines
the frequency of en banc hearings and rehearings, language disparities in
local circuit rules governing en banc procedure, idiosyncrasies in certain
circuit courts’ en banc procedures, and informal polling procedures utilized
by some of the circuits to replace en banc review.
Part III addresses the positive and negative aspects of en banc review, as
enunciated by various judges and scholars. Finally, considering all of these
benefits and criticisms, Part IV argues that petitions for en banc review
should only be raised by judges sua sponte. Further, Part IV contends that
granting petitions for en banc review should require a fewer number of
votes than the simple majority vote required under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 35.
I. BACKGROUND
To understand the en banc procedure one must first understand how the
federal courts of appeals developed a practice of sitting in three-judge
panels, rather than as an entire court. This Part discusses the evolution of
the federal court system, the creation of our now familiar federal courts of
appeals, and the development of the panel system to hear and decide cases.
Part I.A provides a history of the federal court system, the initial debate
over whether a circuit could convene en banc, and the ultimate acceptance
and development of the en banc procedure by the Supreme Court and
Congress. Part I.B examines Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the current appellate rule governing en banc hearings and
rehearings. It also examines related federal procedural rules that impact a
circuit’s ability to convene en banc.
A. The History of En Banc Review
Part I.A.1 discusses the creation of our now-familiar federal courts of
appeals and the evolution of our three-tiered federal court system. Part
I.A.2 discusses the initial circuit split over whether a circuit court could
hear cases as a full court and the approval of the en banc procedure by the
Supreme Court in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner,41 the
ratification of this decision by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 46(c),42 and the
development of the en banc procedure by the Supreme Court in Western
Pacific Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co.43

41. 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006).
43. 345 U.S. 247.
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1. The Evolution of the Courts of Appeals
The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the federal court system.44 The Act
created a Supreme Court, district courts, and the old “Circuit Courts.”45
Section 11 of the Act gave the circuit courts concurrent jurisdiction with the
state courts over civil cases where the amount in controversy exceeded
$500 and where the United States was plaintiff or petitioner; where an alien
was a party; or where the suit was between a citizen of the state where the
suit was brought and a citizen of another state.46 It gave the circuit courts
exclusive jurisdiction of crimes and offenses under the authority of the
United States, except as otherwise provided elsewhere in the Act or by
federal law.47 It gave the circuit courts concurrent jurisdiction with the
district courts for criminal offenses made cognizable by that court.48
Additionally, the Act gave the circuit courts authority to review on writ
of error final decisions of the district courts in civil cases where the amount
in controversy exceeded $50 and, on appeal, final decrees in admiralty and
maritime cases where the matter in controversy exceeded $300.49 Where
the amount in controversy exceeded $2,000, however, the Supreme Court
had appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the circuit court.50
The Act also provided that the circuit courts would sit twice a year in the
various districts comprising their circuit.51 The Act provided that the
circuit courts would sit in three-judge panels, but it did not create circuit
judgeships.52 Rather, a circuit would be composed of two Supreme Court
justices and one district court judge from the district in which the case was
pending.53 No district judge, however, was allowed to sit on appeal from
his own decision.54
When Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1869, it finally provided for
the permanent appointment of circuit judges and appointed one circuit
judge for each of the then-existing nine circuit courts.55 The circuit judge
was to sit on a three-judge panel with two other federal judges drawn from
the Supreme Court or from the district courts comprising the circuit.56
On March 3, 1891, Congress passed the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of
189157 (the Evarts Act). The Evarts Act established the now-familiar three44. See ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 14 (2d ed. 2002).
45. See ROSCOE POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 103–04 (1940). There were
originally three circuits: the eastern, middle, and southern circuits. Id.
46. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
47. Id., 1 Stat. at 78–79.
48. Id., 1 Stat. at 79.
49. Id. §§ 11, 21, 22, 1 Stat. at 78–79, 83–85.
50. Id. § 22, 1 Stat. at 84.
51. Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74–75.
52. See Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision To Grant En
Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 221 (1999).
53. See POUND, supra note 45, at 104.
54. See id.
55. See Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 2, 16 Stat. 44, 44.
56. See id.
57. Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.

2008

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

tiered judicial system and a circuit court of appeals in each circuit.58 The
Evarts Act also created the discretionary writ of certiorari.59
The Evarts Act did not abolish the old circuit courts, but it took away
their appellate jurisdiction over the district courts in their circuits and gave
it to the new circuit courts of appeals.60 The determination of appeals by
the new circuit courts was to be final unless the Supreme Court decided to
grant review by certiorari.61 Review by certiorari, however, “is not a matter
of right, but of judicial discretion,” and will be “granted only for
compelling reasons.”62 The following are some of the reasons that the
Supreme Court has found “compelling”:
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict
with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same
important matter; has decided an important federal question in a way that
conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of
this Court’s supervisory power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in
a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort
or of a United States court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled
by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that
conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.63

Thus, because the writ of certiorari is rarely granted,64 circuit courts have
the final word in most cases.

58. See POUND, supra note 45, at 198.
59. See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five
Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1650–51 (2000). The Supreme
Court maintained mandatory appellate jurisdiction over many of the cases decided by the
courts of appeals, but was given discretionary appellate jurisdiction over cases otherwise
deemed “final” in these courts. See id.
60. See POUND, supra note 45, at 198 (“[R]eview of judgments, decrees, and sentences
in the District and Circuit Courts was committed to the Circuit Courts of Appeals.”).
61. See id.
62. SUP. CT. R. 10. In the first two years after the Evarts Act, only two petitions for
certiorari were granted. See Hartnett, supra note 59, at 1656. Congress expanded the
Supreme Court’s discretionary power over their appellate docket in the Judges’ Bill of 1925.
See Emily Grant et al., The Ideological Divide: Conflict and the Supreme Court’s Certiorari
Decision, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559, 565 (2012). The Judges’ Bill of 1925 eliminated many
categories of cases for which Supreme Court review was mandatory and instead made these
cases reviewable by a writ of certiorari. Id. The Supreme Court, by way of the Judges’ Bill,
“effectively ‘achieved absolute and arbitrary discretion over the bulk of its docket.’” Id.
(quoting Hartnett, supra note 59, at 1705).
63. SUP. CT. R. 10.
64. The contemporary Supreme Court hears far fewer cases than its predecessors. See
Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1224 (2012). Since the 2005 term, the Supreme Court has
decided an average of eighty cases per term. See id. at 1225. Earlier in the twentieth century
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Section 2 of the Evarts Act carried forward the practice of sitting in
three-judge panels by providing that each circuit court “shall consist of
three judges.”65 The Evarts Act also created an additional circuit judge for
each circuit, thus “providing two circuit judges in all the circuits except the
second, which, having received an additional judge in 1887, now had
three.”66 The third spot on the three-judge panel would be filled by either a
district judge or a Supreme Court justice.67
In the Judicial Code of 1911, Congress finally abolished the old circuit
courts created by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and vested all original
jurisdiction in the district courts.68 Additionally, it codified section 2 of the
Evarts Act without material change—it kept the circuit courts of appeals
established by the Evarts Act and carried forward the three-judge panel
requirement.69 The Code, however, increased the number of circuit judges
from three to four in the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, although it
made no express provision authorizing these judges to sit in panels of more
than three judges.70 Because Congress allowed these circuits to have more
than three judges, there was uncertainty as to whether Congress intended
these circuits to continue hearing cases only by three-judge panels or
whether a full court hearing was also permissible.71
In the following years, as court dockets and caseloads grew, Congress
continued to increase the number of circuit judgeships across all the
circuits, but the circuits continued the practice of sitting in divisions of three
judges rather than sitting as an entire court.72 The increased number of
circuit judges, however, presented the likelihood of inconsistent panel
decisions within the circuit and created the need for an administrative
solution.73
2. The En Banc Procedure
The en banc procedure was first approved by the Supreme Court in 1941
in Textile Mills,74 after the Third and Ninth Circuits generated conflicting
decisions over whether the court had the power to convene itself en banc.

the average was approximately 200 cases per term. Id. For a comprehensive survey of the
decline in the Supreme Court’s docket size, see id.
65. See Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826.
66. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 29 (6th ed. 2009); POUND, supra note 45, at 197. In the following
years, additional judges were added to each circuit at various times. POUND, supra note 45, at
197.
67. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 66, at 29–30.
68. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
133 (1928).
69. See George, supra note 52, at 224.
70. A. Lamar Alexander, Jr., Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals:
Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities (Part 1), 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 570 (1965).
71. See id. at 570–71.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 570–72.
74. 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
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The Ninth Circuit, on June 27, 1938, was the first circuit court to address
the permissibility of circuit courts sitting en banc. In Bank of America
National Trust & Savings Ass’n v. Commissioner,75 a divided Ninth Circuit
panel decided a question regarding estate taxes. In Lang’s Estate v.
Commissioner,76 decided one year later, a different Ninth Circuit panel
addressed the same question but disagreed with the decision of the Bank of
America panel.77 The panel in Lang’s Estate concluded, however, that the
Judicial Code of 1911 did not allow “more than three judges [to] sit in the
Circuit Court of Appeals, [and] there [was] no method of hearing or
rehearing by a larger number.”78 Thus, rather than overrule the Bank of
America decision, the Lang’s Estate panel presented a certificate to the
Supreme Court to answer the estate tax question.79
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and agreed with the second panel
on the estate tax question, but did not address the question of whether a
circuit court had the power to convene itself en banc.80
By contrast, two years later, in Commissioner v. Textile Mills Securities
Corp.,81 the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, noted that although contrary to
the Ninth Circuit’s holding, a circuit court has the power to sit en banc.82
The Third Circuit justified its use of the en banc procedure by explaining:
“A court, as distinguished from the quorum of its members whom it may
authorize to act in its name, cannot consist of less than the whole number of
its members.”83 It contended that holding otherwise would “destroy the
authority of the court as a court and [would] open the way to possible
confusion and conflict among its personnel and in its procedure and
decisions.”84 The potential for this confusion occurs most significantly, the
court said, where “there is a difference in view among the judges upon a
question of fundamental importance” and where a panel “sitting in a case
may have a view contrary to that of the other . . . judges of the court.”85 In
these situations, the court reasoned, “it is advisable that the whole court
have the opportunity, if it thinks it necessary, to hear and decide the
question.”86
In light of “the public importance” of the en banc question and to resolve
the conflict between the Third and Ninth Circuits, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Textile Mills87 and unanimously decided that the

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

90 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1937).
97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1938).
See id. at 869.
See id.
See id. at 869–70.
See generally Lang v. Comm’r, 304 U.S. 264 (1938).
117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1940) (en banc), aff’d, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
See id. at 67–71.
See id. at 70.
See id.
See id. at 71.
See id.
314 U.S. 326, 327 (1941).
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federal courts of appeals have the power to convene themselves en banc.88
In its decision, the Court noted that allowing a court to sit en banc “makes
for more effective judicial administration,” avoids intracircuit conflicts, and
promotes “[f]inality of decision in the circuit courts of appeal.”89 After
approving the en banc device in Textile Mills, the Supreme Court stopped
accepting cases certified to it by a court of appeals in order to resolve a
point of intracircuit conflict.90
On June 25, 1948, Congress codified the Textile Mills decision in section
46(c) of the Judicial Code of 1948.91 Section 46(c) provides:
Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or panel
of not more than three judges . . . unless a hearing or rehearing before the
court in banc is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit
who are in regular active service. A court in banc shall consist of all
circuit judges in regular active service. . . .92

The Reviser’s Note explains:
This section preserves the interpretation established by the Textile Mills
case but provides in subsection (c) that cases shall be heard by a court of
not more than three judges unless the court has provided for hearing in
banc. This provision continues the tradition of a three-judge appellate
court and makes the decision of a division, the decision of the court,
unless rehearing in banc is ordered. It makes judges available for other
assignments, and permits a rotation of judges in such manner as to give to
each a maximum of time for the preparation of opinions.93

Textile Mills and the Judicial Code of 1948 clearly give the federal courts
of appeals the power to convene en banc. However, neither Textile Mills
nor the Judicial Code of 1948 prescribe any particular en banc procedures
for the circuit courts to follow, nor do they state the types of cases that are
appropriate for en banc review. The Supreme Court did not offer any more
clarity on the power to convene en banc until it decided Western Pacific
twelve years later.94
In Western Pacific, the Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)
empowers, but does not compel, federal circuit courts to sit en banc.95 The
Court determined that § 46(c) does not give litigants the power to compel a
circuit court to entertain each motion for a hearing or rehearing en banc, and
a party cannot challenge the circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a
88. See id. at 333–35.
89. See id. at 334–35.
90. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957) (refusing to grant
certiorari to resolve potential conflict between two Eighth Circuit panels).
91. See United States v. Am.-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689 (1960) (noting that
section 46(c) “was added to the Judicial Code in 1948 simply as a legislative ratification of
Textile Mills” (internal quotation mark omitted)).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006).
93. Id. note (Historical and Statutory Notes).
94. See W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247 (1953).
95. See id. at 250 (“In our view, § 46(c) is not addressed to litigants. It is addressed to
the Court of Appeals. It is a grant of power. It vests in the court the power to order hearings
en banc. It goes no further.”).
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request for an en banc hearing.96 Rather, § 46(c) allows a circuit court “to
devise its own administrative machinery to provide the means whereby a
majority may order [an en banc] hearing.”97 The Court, after holding that a
litigant cannot compel a circuit court to formally examine an en banc
petition and that § 46(c) does not require any particular en banc procedures,
devised “certain fundamental [en banc] requirements [that] should be
observed by the Courts of Appeals.”98
The Court enunciated five requirements: First, the circuit court must
clearly define the procedure it uses to determine whether to convene en
banc.99 Second, the circuit may adopt a practice where a majority of the
full court determines whether to convene en banc or it may delegate this
decision to a division of the full court; however, a majority of the full court
always has the power to revise the circuit’s en banc procedures and
withdraw any decisionmaking power delegated to a division of the court.100
Third, the circuit must give a litigant the opportunity “to suggest to the
court, or to the division . . . that a particular case is appropriate for
consideration by all the judges.”101 Fourth, a circuit has the power to
initiate an en banc hearing sua sponte.102 Fifth, the decision of whether to
hear a case en banc must be decided separately from the decision of
whether there should be a rehearing before a three-judge panel.103
Following the Supreme Court’s Western Pacific decision, each circuit
enacted its own rules and developed its own case law governing the en banc
procedure.104 The broadly defined en banc requirements enunciated in
Western Pacific gave the federal circuit courts ample discretion to create
their own en banc procedures. The en banc procedural rules developed by
each circuit were not uniform and often did not fully explain the processes
used by the courts when considering whether to grant en banc review.105
B. Rule 35 and Related Rules
When considering available options, a practitioner who has suffered an
adverse determination by a three-judge panel will turn to Rule 35 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.106
Rule 35 governs en banc hearings and rehearings in the federal courts of
appeals.107 Congress ratified Rule 35 in 1967, intending to standardize the
en banc procedures across the circuits.108

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See id. at 252, 259.
See id. at 250.
See id. at 260.
See id. at 260–61.
Id. at 261.
Id.
See id. at 262.
See id. at 262–63.
See infra notes 121–26 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.
See FED. R. APP. P. 35.
See id.
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Rule 35 tracked the language of 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) by stating that “[a]
majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service may order
that an appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of
appeals in banc.”109 Rule 35 sets time limits and certain procedures for a
party petitioning for a hearing or rehearing en banc, provides that the court
is not required to file a response to a suggestion for a hearing or rehearing
en banc, and provides that an en banc hearing or rehearing “is not favored
and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en banc consideration is
necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (2)
the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.”110
The “maintain[ing] uniformity” test allows the circuit courts to use the en
banc process to resolve intracircuit conflict.111
The “exceptional
importance” test anticipates future conflict between the majority of the
judges of a circuit and a three-judge panel’s decision and permits the full
court to rehear the case before that anticipated conflict arises.112 The 1967
Advisory Committee’s Note makes clear that Rule 35 does not affect the
power of the court to initiate en banc hearings or rehearings sua sponte—in
other words, the court can initiate the en banc procedure without the request
of a litigant.113
Generally, a case will be heard en banc only if three conditions are met:
(1) a litigant files a petition or a judge asks for a hearing or rehearing en
banc,114 (2) a judge in active service on the circuit requests that the entire
court be polled on the suggestion,115 and (3) a majority of the judges in
active service vote to grant the petition.116

108. See Mario Lucero, Note, The Second Circuit’s En Banc Crisis, 2013 CARDOZO L.
REV. DE NOVO 32, 38 (2013).
109. See FED. R. APP. P. 35 (1967) (amended 2005). This language was amended in 2005
and now states: “A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service and who
are not disqualified may order that an appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the
court of appeals en banc.” FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (emphasis added). This language was added
as a result of a circuit split regarding how disqualified judges were to be dealt with in
determining how many judges made up a majority of the court. Id. advisory committee’s
note. The 2005 amendment adopted the “case majority” approach where disqualified judges
are not counted in the base number of judges when determining whether a majority of judges
have voted to hear a case en banc. Id. Additionally, senior circuit judges are not eligible to
participate in the decision of a case on rehearing en banc. See United States v. Am.-Foreign
S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 688 (1960). This is because en banc courts should not be
employed unless “extraordinary circumstances exist that call for authoritative consideration
and decision by those charged with the administration and development of the law of the
circuit.” See id. at 689.
110. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)–(c), (e). In United States v. American-Foreign Steamship
Corp., the Supreme Court declared that “[e]n banc courts are the exception, not the rule” and
should be “convened only when extraordinary circumstances exist that call for authoritative
consideration and decision by those charged with the administration and development of the
law of the circuit.” See Am.-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. at 689.
111. See Solimine, supra note 21, at 325–38.
112. See Note, The Politics of En Banc Review, 102 HARV. L. REV. 864, 876 (1989).
113. See FED. R. APP. P. 35 advisory committee’s note.
114. See id. R. 35(b).
115. See id. R. 35(f).
116. See id. R. 35(a).
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In the Omnibus Judgeship Act, which was passed on October 20, 1978,
Congress authorized federal circuit courts consisting of more than fifteen
judges to delegate en banc authority to a division of the full court,
commonly referred to as a “mini en banc hearing” or “limited en banc
court.”117 Currently, the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have more than
fifteen authorized judgeships.118 But only the Ninth Circuit has exercised
this option formally.119 Many circuits, however, have devised methods of
informal en banc review.120
Each court of appeals has authority to make and amend rules governing
its own practice and procedure.121 These rules are referred to as the “local
rules” of the circuit.122 Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure says that “local rules” are to be enacted by a majority of the
circuit’s judges “in regular active service.”123 It also provides that a local
rule must be consistent with federal law, the appellate rules, and local rules
of the circuit.124 Every circuit has a local rule governing the en banc
procedure.125 Additionally, the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits have “internal operating procedures” governing
petitions for en banc hearings or rehearings.126
II. SURVEY OF THE CIRCUITS: INCONSISTENCY
This Part surveys the various points of inconsistency in en banc
procedures across the federal courts of appeals. Part II.A analyzes the
frequency at which particular circuits implement the en banc procedure.
Part II.B scrutinizes the local rules and internal operating procedures of the
117. See Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006)).
118. See 28 U.S.C. § 44. The Fifth Circuit has seventeen authorized judgeships, the Sixth
Circuit has sixteen authorized judgeships, and the Ninth Circuit has twenty-eight authorized
judgeships. See id.
119. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (“The en banc court, for each case or group of related cases
taken en banc, shall consist of the Chief Judge of this circuit and 10 additional judges to be
drawn by lot from the active judges of the Court.”).
120. See infra Part II.D.
121. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071.
122. See FED. R. APP. P. 47.
123. See id. R. 47(a)(1).
124. See id. R. 47(b).
125. See 11TH CIR. R. 35-1 to -11; 1ST CIR. R. 35; 6TH CIR. R. 35; D.C. CIR. R. 35; 2D CIR.
R. 35.1; 8TH CIR. R. 35A; 5TH CIR. R. 35; 9TH CIR. R. 35-1 to -4; FED. CIR. R. 35; 3D CIR. R.
35.0–.4; 4TH CIR. R. 35; 7TH CIR R. 35; 10TH CIR. R. 35.1–.7.
126. See 11TH CIR. I.O.P. (accompanying FED. R. APP. P. 35); 6TH CIR. I.O.P. 35; 3D CIR.
I.O.P. 2.2, 9.1–.6; 2D CIR. I.O.P. 35.1; 5TH CIR. I.O.P. (Petition for Rehearing En Banc); 7TH
CIR. APP. III I.O.P. 5; 1ST CIR. I.O.P. X. Internal operating procedures guide the inner conduct
of the court. See 20A JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 347.12 (3d ed.
2013). However, unlike local rules, a circuit court promulgating or amending an internal
operating procedure does not have to give appropriate public notice and opportunity for
comment. See id. §§ 347.11–.12. Appellate Rule 47(a)(1) mentions internal operating
procedures but does not describe them. See FED. R. APP. P. 47(a)(1). Rule 47, however,
prohibits a circuit court from putting “[a] generally applicable direction to parties or lawyers
regarding practice before a court” in an internal operating procedure, rather, it must be in a
local rule. See id.
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various circuits to identify where language differences exist between:
(1) the local rules of the circuits themselves and (2) the local rules of the
circuits and Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Part II.C
looks at idiosyncrasies of particular circuits’ en banc procedures. Finally,
Part II.D identifies informal polling procedures utilized by some circuit
courts to undo a circuit’s precedent without further briefing or argument by
the litigants.
A. Frequency of Use
En banc hearings and rehearings represent a small fraction of all cases
heard by the federal courts of appeals. For example, in 2010, the circuit
courts heard forty-five cases en banc out of more than 30,914 cases
terminated on their merits.127 While en banc review is relatively rare in all
circuits, the circuits vary in how frequently they use the en banc
procedure.128 For instance, the Federal Circuit seems particularly attuned to
using en banc review,129 while the Second Circuit is the least likely to use
it.130
1. The Second Circuit’s “Tradition”
One reason the Second Circuit may tend to refrain from invoking the en
banc procedure is because of “tradition.”131 Second Circuit Judge Robert
A. Katzmann explains that the Second Circuit has a “longstanding tradition
of general deference to panel adjudication—a tradition which holds whether
or not the judges of the Court agree with the panel’s disposition of the
matter before it. Throughout [its] history, [the Second Circuit] ha[s]
proceeded to a full hearing en banc only in rare and exceptional
circumstances.”132

127. See SECOND CIRCUIT COURTS COMM., supra note 25, at 5.
128. For example, looking at the data from 2001 to 2009, the frequency of en banc cases
in each circuit from lowest to highest, based on the percentage of en banc cases of a circuits’
total docket, was: 0.01 percent in the Second Circuit; 0.07 percent in each of the Third,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits; 0.08 percent in the Fifth Circuit; 0.09 percent in the Fourth
Circuit; 0.10 percent in the First Circuit; 0.13 percent in the Sixth Circuit; 0.14 percent in the
Ninth Circuit; 0.15 percent in the D.C. Circuit; 0.19 percent in the Tenth Circuit; 0.23
percent in the Eighth Circuit; and 0.30 percent in the Federal Circuit. See Ryan Vacca,
Acting Like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 MO. L. REV. 733,
738 (2011).
129. Other circuits that hear a larger proportion of cases en banc include the D.C., Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. See SECOND CIRCUIT COURTS COMM., supra note 25, at 6.
130. See id. From 2000 through 2010, the average number of en banc cases heard in the
Second Circuit was about one-eighth that of the system-wide average. See id. at 4.
131. See Wilfred Feinberg, Unique Customs and Practices of the Second Circuit, 14
HOFSTRA L. REV. 297, 311 (1986) (“The tradition of hostility to in bancs goes back a long
way in the Second Circuit. Learned Hand strongly disapproved of in bancs, and while he
was Chief Judge [the Second Circuit] had none.”). See generally Ricci v. DeStefano, 530
F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2008) (denying rehearing en banc).
132. See Ricci, 530 F.3d at 89–90 (Katzmann, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en
banc); see also id. at 89 (Calabresi, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc)
(“[R]ehearing en banc is always a matter of choice, not necessity . . . .”).
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Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs, also of the Second Circuit, criticizes using
“tradition” as a reason not to grant en banc hearings and rehearings.133 He
argues that by using tradition to avoid convening en banc, the Second
Circuit fails to exercise the discretion called for by Rule 35.134 He further
argues that the exercise of discretion to hear cases en banc is integral to the
judicial process particularly because “en banc proceeding[s] provide[] a
safeguard against unnecessary intercircuit conflicts.”135 Finally, he argues,
relying on tradition to deny en banc rehearings “look[s] very much like
abuse of discretion.”136
2. Shaping Patent Policy in the Federal Circuit
Out of all thirteen circuits, the Federal Circuit hears the largest
proportion of its total cases en banc.137 Professor Ryan Vacca has offered
two possible explanations for this.138
The first is geographic proximity—because all the active judges on the
Federal Circuit sit in only one location—Washington, D.C.—it is
particularly easy for them to convene as a full court.139 However, while
this may explain some of the differences between the Federal Circuit and
other circuits, it does not explain the difference between the Federal Circuit
and the D.C. Circuit, where all of the active judges also sit in only one
location.140
The second possible explanation is that the Federal Circuit uses its en
banc procedure to engage in substantive rulemaking.141 The Federal Circuit
serves as the appellate body for cases “arising under[] any Act of Congress
relating to patents,”142 and, accordingly, “[t]he Federal Circuit’s numerous
en banc hearings . . . set forth rules regarding a wide range of issues and
sub-issues . . . which consequently set patent policy.”143 Professor Vacca
argues that the Federal Circuit’s frequent use of en banc sittings make the
court look much like an administrative agency engaging in substantive
rulemaking, and he suggests this practice is beneficial in shaping patent
policy as a whole.144

133. See id. at 92–93 (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
134. See id.
135. See id. at 93 (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 35 advisory committee’s notes (1998
Amendments)).
136. See id.
137. See Vacca, supra note 128, at 738–39.
138. See id. at 738, 744–59.
139. See id. at 738–39.
140. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981–1990, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1008, 1016 (1991). The D.C. Circuit hears on average 0.15 percent fewer
cases en banc than the Federal Circuit. See supra note 128.
141. See Vacca, supra note 128, at 744–49.
142. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006) (granting the Federal Circuit “exclusive
jurisdiction” over appeals in cases where a district court’s jurisdiction was based on a
congressional act relating to patents).
143. Vacca, supra note 128, at 747.
144. See generally Vacca, supra note 128.
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3. Utilizing En Banc Review To Maintain
Intracircuit Consistency
There seems to be a correlation between the frequency of en banc
hearings and rehearings in a particular circuit and the size of the circuit
court. Larger circuits may need to use en banc review more frequently in
order to maintain intracircuit consistency.145 In theory, the consistency of
decisions of a court sitting in panels would diminish “as the pool of judges
from which a panel may be drawn expands.”146 The First Circuit’s en banc
practice suggests that this theory has some merit. For example, from 1983
to 2007, the First Circuit, the circuit with the smallest number of judgeships
(at only nine judges, of which five are active-duty judges),147 handed down
only forty-four en banc rulings.148 This suggests that the First Circuit may
not use en banc review to maintain intracircuit consistency but rather may
grant en banc review only to hear cases of “exceptional importance.”149
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit, the circuit with the largest number of
judgeships (at twenty-seven active-duty judges), hears a larger proportion
of its total cases en banc.150 Thus, these statistics suggest that a larger court
will have a greater reason to resort to rehearings en banc more frequently to
maintain consistency in its panel decisions.151
4. The Costs of En Banc Review
The frequency of en banc hearings and rehearings in a particular circuit
may be impacted by the costs associated with using the procedure. A larger
court must incur a greater cost to hear a case en banc for two reasons. First,
in a larger court, more judges have to hear or rehear the case, which
increases the amount of total judicial time consumed. Second, the time
spent preparing an opinion after an en banc sitting is significantly greater
for larger courts.152 This is because “[t]he author of the opinion for the
145. See Procter Hug, Jr. & Carl Tobias, A Preferable Approach for the Ninth Circuit, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 1657, 1668 (2000).
146. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 140, at 1018.
147. See Judges, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FIRST CIRCUIT, http://www.ca1.uscourts.
gov/judges (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (listing the names of both active and senior judges on
the court).
148. See Stephen L. Wasby, A Look at the Smallest Circuit, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 417,
429–30 (2010). Most First Circuit en banc courts are composed of five, six, or seven judges.
Id. at 435. While an en banc court consists of all active judges, senior judges who were on
the panel of a case being reheard en banc may sit on the en banc court. See id. at 434.
149. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(2). “The small number of judges on the [First Circuit]—
small even if the senior judges are included—may facilitate greater collegiality . . . .” Wasby,
supra note 148, at 424. This may also explain the low number of concurring and dissenting
First Circuit opinions. Id.
150. See supra note 128. This may also be because of the Ninth Circuit’s limited en banc
court. See infra Part II.C.1.
151. In an empirical study of en banc decisions by district courts it was found that
districts with more judges were more likely to sit en banc. See Ahmed E. Taha, How Panels
Affect Judges: Evidence from United States District Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1235, 1273
(2005).
152. See Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 140, at 1018–20.
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court must circulate it to [all judges] rather than to two colleagues, each of
whom may make comments or suggestions, or indeed, launch a dissent that
needs to be addressed.”153 Additionally, revising opinions consumes much
more time on hearings or rehearings en banc than it does with a three-judge
panel because
at each step the opinion writer must accommodate multiple, sometimes
conflicting, suggestions; and the author must secure anew the concurrence
of each member of the majority or minority for which he or she writes
each time the opinion is revised in response to a further iteration by the
other faction.154

Thus, it is significantly less costly for a smaller court—like the First
Circuit—to hold an en banc hearing or rehearing rather than a larger
court—like the Fifth155 or Ninth Circuit.156
In sum, the circuits have differing opinions about the utility of en banc
proceedings. Those circuits that frequently invoke the en banc procedure
presumably believe it is useful to do so. Those circuits that rarely invoke
the en banc procedure presumably believe the cost of doing so is not
outweighed by a benefit to the administration of justice.
B. Lack of Uniformity in Language
Because Western Pacific gave the circuit courts ample discretion to
establish en banc procedures,157 the circuit courts enacted local en banc
rules and internal operating procedures to govern their en banc procedures.
These rules, however, are often circuit specific and contain differences from
other regional circuits and also from the text of Rule 35.
1. Exceptional “Public” Importance
Rule 35(a)(2) states, “An en banc hearing or rehearing is not favored and
ordinarily will not be ordered unless the proceeding involves a question of
exceptional importance.”158 The Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have a
local rule that states that en banc review is an extraordinary procedure
intended to focus the full court on an issue of “exceptional public
importance.”159 This language differs from Rule 35, which does not

153. Id. at 1019.
154. See id.
155. The Fifth Circuit, with seventeen authorized judgeships, is the next largest circuit
after the Ninth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (2006).
156. Although the costs associated with en banc sittings are greater for larger courts,
some larger courts (like the Ninth Circuit) convene en banc at a greater frequency than
smaller courts. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. This suggests that the risk of
intracircuit inconsistency justifies the use of the costly en banc procedure. See supra Part
II.A.3.
157. See W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 250 (1953).
158. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(2) (emphasis added).
159. See 6TH CIR. I.O.P. 35 (emphasis added); 5TH CIR. I.O.P. (Petition for Rehearing En
Banc) (emphasis added); 10TH CIR. R. 35.1(A) (emphasis added).
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specify that matters must be of exceptional importance to the “public.”160 It
also differs from the local rules of the Third, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits,
which do not specify that matters must be of exceptional importance to the
public.161 The First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits do
not have a local rule altering Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
35(a)(2).162 The Ninth Circuit Local Rule does not mention the exceptional
importance test but, rather, sets up a unique test of its own.163
Determining what “exceptional importance” means is not an easy task
and “begs the question of whether courts should weigh the impact on the
public, the judiciary, or the parties.”164 A case is likely to be of exceptional
importance to the public “if it concerns either a unique issue of great
moment to the community, or a recurring issue that is likely to affect a large
number of cases or persons.”165 In the history of the D.C. Circuit’s en banc
practice, the cases arising out of the Watergate affair and the cases
involving the subpoena of the President’s tapes are examples of cases that
were considered of exceptional importance to the public.166
Alternatively, a case is likely to be of exceptional importance to the court
if it involves “questions concerning the jurisdiction of the court or the
standards for determining the justiciability of a particular case—including
matters such as standing, and ripeness.”167 This is because “[t]he resolution
of these questions provides the bar with important guidance as to whether
and when a party may litigate in [a] circuit.”168
And finally, a case is likely to be of exceptional importance to the parties
when, although the issues raised are not particularly significant to the public
generally or to the court, the “cases involv[e] large amounts of money or
hav[e] extraordinary emotional impact upon the individuals involved,
regardless of the likely importance of the case as a precedent.”169
160. See FED. R. APP. P. 35.
161. See 11TH CIR. R. 35-3; FED. CIR. R. 35(b); 3D CIR. R. 35.1.
162. See 1ST CIR. R. 35; D.C. CIR. R. 35; 2D CIR. R. 35; 8TH CIR. R. 35A; 4TH CIR. R. 35;
7TH CIR. R. 35.
163. See infra Part II.B.3.
164. See Sarah J. Berkus, Note, A Critique and Comparison of En Banc Review in the
Tenth and D.C. Circuits and United States v. Nacchio, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1069, 1073
(2009).
165. See Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 140, at 1025.
166. See id. at 1025–26.
167. See id. at 1028–29. Despite the Tenth Circuit’s local rule that it will only take cases
of “exceptional public importance,” it has interpreted this language loosely and often takes
cases based on their importance to judicial administration. See, e.g., United States v.
Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (granting en banc review to determine
whether evidentiary evidence was properly excluded); Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108
(10th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (granting en banc review to determine whether a claim of
excessive force must be subsumed into a claim of unlawful seizure); Robbins v. Chronister,
435 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (granting en banc review to determine whether to
place a cap on attorneys’ fees for those representing prisoners).
168. See id. at 1029.
169. Id. at 1032. Some commentators have doubted the legitimacy of exceptional
importance to the parties as a criterion for allocating the attention of the full court. Id. at
1031–32. The Federal Circuit’s “practice notes” seem to recognize that this type of
“exceptional importance” is not legitimate. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED.
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However, because courts rarely state their reasons for granting en banc
review and because en banc cases rarely fit neatly into one category or the
other, it is extremely difficult to classify to whom and to what extent the
court considers the matter exceptionally important.170
2. En Banc Review of Opinions Directly Conflicting
with State Law Precedent
While en banc review can be extremely beneficial, it also comes with
great costs.171 For example, the Fifth Circuit Rules seem to discourage
filings of suggestions for en banc review.172 Local Rule 35 of the Fifth
Circuit recognizes that “each request for en banc consideration . . . is a
serious call on limited judicial resources.”173 The corresponding Fifth
Circuit internal operating procedure refers to the extraordinary nature of
petitions for rehearing en banc and characterizes these suggestions as “the
most abused prerogative.”174 This internal operating procedure also states,
however, that “[a] petition for rehearing en banc is an extraordinary
procedure that is intended to bring to the attention of the entire court an
error of exceptional public importance or an opinion that directly conflicts
with prior Supreme Court, Fifth Circuit or state law precedent.”175 No
other circuit has a local rule that states that the en banc procedure is
appropriate when an opinion directly conflicts with state law precedent.
Rather, the Sixth Circuit Rules and the Eleventh Circuit Rules explicitly
state that an alleged error in the determination of state law is not appropriate
grounds for a rehearing en banc but instead is a matter for panel
rehearing.176
In theory, the Fifth Circuit’s internal operating procedure authorizing en
banc review of decisions that directly conflict with state law precedent
suggests that the Fifth Circuit has broader discretion in deciding whether to
grant en banc review. The Fifth Circuit, the largest circuit after the Ninth
Circuit, however, hears very few cases en banc.177 From 2001 to 2009, for
example, the Fifth Circuit heard only 0.08 percent of its total cases en
banc.178 In comparison, the First Circuit, the smallest circuit, heard 0.10
percent of its total cases en banc during the same time period.179

CIRCUIT, RULES OF PRACTICE 77 (2011), available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/
stories/rules-of-practice/rules.pdf (“A petition for rehearing en banc is rarely appropriate if
the appeal was the subject of a nonprecedential opinion by the panel of judges that heard
it.”).
170. See Berkus, supra note 164.
171. See infra Part III.B; see also supra Part II.A.4.
172. See 5TH CIR. R. 35.1; 5TH CIR. I.O.P. 35.
173. See 5TH CIR. R. 35.1.
174. See 5TH CIR. I.O.P. 35.
175. See id. (emphasis added).
176. See 6TH CIR. I.O.P. 35(a); see also 11TH CIR. R. 35-3.
177. See supra note 128.
178. See id.
179. See id.
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3. The Ninth Circuit’s “Stringent” Rule
The Ninth Circuit has a local rule that states that “[w]hen the opinion of a
panel directly conflicts with an existing opinion by another court of appeals
and substantially affects a rule of national application in which there is an
overriding need for national uniformity, the existence of such conflict is an
appropriate ground for petitioning for rehearing en banc.”180 The Ninth
Circuit’s local rule seems to reject using en banc review to maintain
intracircuit consistency181 because it requires a panel opinion to directly
conflict with an opinion by “another court of appeals”182 and also requires
that the decision substantially affects a rule of national application.183
Although the Ninth Circuit Rules seem to limit the types of cases that
warrant en banc review, the Ninth Circuit grants en banc review at a
significantly higher rate than most other circuits.184
4. Rules Governing Amicus Curiae Briefs in Connection
with Petitions for En Banc Review
Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure governs the
submission of amicus curiae briefs prior to the issuance of a panel
decision.185 The rule permits governmental parties to file an amicus curiae
brief as of right (i.e., “without the consent of parties or leave of court”); all
other potential amici, however, “must obtain either consent of all the parties
or leave of court to file a brief.”186
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted additional local rules governing the
submission of amicus curiae briefs in support of petitions for rehearing or
rehearing en banc.187 Consistent with Rule 29, governmental parties may
file an amicus curiae brief in support of a petition for rehearing or rehearing
en banc as of right.188 However, a nongovernmental entity or an individual
must obtain leave of court to file an amicus curiae brief in support of a
petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc.189 The Eleventh Circuit local
rules require court approval—consent of the parties is not adequate.190 The
180. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-1.
181. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a)(1), however, specifically states that en
banc hearings or rehearings can be ordered when “en banc consideration is necessary to
secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions.” FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(1).
182. 9TH CIR. R. 35-1. The Supreme Court has indicated that a conflict between circuits
may be an appropriate reason to grant an en banc rehearing, at least when the judges of a
circuit express doubt about the correctness of their own circuit’s precedent. See Groves v.
Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 172 n.8 (1990).
183. 9TH CIR. R. 35-1.
184. See supra note 128.
185. See FED. R. APP. P. 29(a).
186. See P. Stephen Gidiere III, The Facts and Fictions of Amicus Curiae Practice in the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 5 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (quoting FED. R.
APP. P. 29(a)).
187. See 11TH CIR. R. 35-6, 35-9.
188. See id. R. 35-6.
189. See id.
190. See id.
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local rules also contain requirements on the contents, length, and time for
filing of all amicus curiae briefs in support of a petition for rehearing or
rehearing en banc.191
The Eleventh Circuit’s local rules governing amicus briefs in support of
petitions for rehearing or rehearings en banc are more restrictive than the
majority of other circuits.192 Most other circuits do not have specific local
rules governing amicus curiae briefs at the rehearing or rehearing en banc
stages, which means that the general requirements of Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 29(a), which allows filing by consent of all the parties,
apply in those circuits.193 The D.C. Circuit has the most restrictive local
rule at the en banc stage, allowing amicus curiae briefs only by invitation of
the court.194
5. Frivolous En Banc Petitions and Rule 11 Sanctions
The Fifth, Eighth, and Federal Circuits have a local rule which cautions
litigants not to file frivolous en banc petitions.195 Their local rules make
clear that frivolous en banc petitions that do not meet the standards of
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 may subject the person who signed
the petitions, the represented party, or both to Rule 11 sanctions.196
This is noteworthy because many judges and commentators argue that
the en banc procedure is inefficient and a waste of judicial resources
because litigants generally file en banc petitions as a matter of course.197
The Fifth, Eighth, and Federal Circuit local rules seem to be attempting to
address this issue.198
In practice, however, the Federal Circuit hears the most cases en banc
proportionately compared to the other circuits, the Eighth Circuit hears the
second most cases en banc, and the Fifth Circuit hears the ninth most cases
en banc.199 Thus, it is not clear that the sanction rules effectively deter an

191. See id.
192. See Gidiere, supra note 186, at 4.
193. See id. at 4–5.
194. See D.C. CIR. R. 35(f).
195. See 8TH CIR. R. 35A(2); 5TH CIR. R. 35.1; FED. CIR. R. 35(a)(2).
196. See 8TH CIR. R. 35A(2) (“The court may assess costs against counsel who files a
frivolous petition for rehearing en banc deemed to have multiplied the proceedings in the
case and to have increased costs unreasonably and vexatiously. At the court’s order, counsel
personally may be required to pay those costs to the opposing party.”); 5TH CIR. R. 35.1
(“The court takes the view that, given the extraordinary nature of petitions for en banc
consideration, it is fully justified in imposing sanctions on its own initiative . . . upon the
person who signed the petitions, the represented party, or both, for manifest abuse of the
procedure.”); FED. CIR. R. 35(a)(2) (“A petition for hearing or rehearing en banc that does
not meet the standards of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a) may be deemed
frivolous and subject to sanctions.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (“[T]he court may
impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated [Rule 11,
which requires a representation of nonfrivolity,] or is responsible for the violation.”).
197. See Kaufman, supra note 31, at 57.
198. See 8TH CIR. R. 35A(2); 5TH CIR. R. 35.1; FED. CIR. R. 35(a)(2).
199. See supra note 128.
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attorney or litigants’ decision of whether to file a petition for an en banc
hearing or rehearing.200
C. Unique Idiosyncrasies
Various circuit courts have developed their own unique practices for both
choosing en banc cases and for conducting en banc review. While some of
these practices are listed in the circuits’ local rules, others are not. A couple
of examples of unique idiosyncrasies of certain circuits are discussed in
turn.
1. The Limited En Banc Court
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to formally exercise the limited en
banc court option made available by Congress in the Omnibus Judgeship
Act of 1978.201 The “limited en banc” is not truly “en banc” because it is
not the full court. There are currently twenty-seven active-duty judges on
the Ninth Circuit,202 but the limited en banc court consists of only eleven
Ninth Circuit judges203—fewer than half of all active judges. The Ninth
Circuit’s en banc court consists not of all twenty-seven active judges on the
circuit, but rather of the chief judge of the Ninth Circuit (or, in the absence
of the chief judge, the next most senior active judge) and ten additional
judges to be drawn by lot from the active judges of the court.204
Some critics of the limited en banc procedure disfavor it because it could
allow a minority view to become the judgment of the full court.205 On the
Ninth Circuit, it takes a vote of fourteen judges to hear an appeal of a threejudge decision en banc.206 In theory, the eleven judges on the Ninth
Circuit’s en banc panel, ten of whom are chosen at random from the full
court, may come to a different result than the full court would. This is
because six judges, a simple majority of the eleven-member en banc panel,

200. Very few en banc petitions, however, are manifestly frivolous and, therefore, “each
judge is burdened with considering each suggestion to the extent necessary to determine
whether it is one of those few cases each year that really should be reheard en banc.” See
Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 140, at 1051.
201. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3; see also Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat.
1629, 1633 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006)) (providing that any federal
appellate court with more than fifteen active judges could “perform its en banc function by
such number of [judges] . . . as may be prescribed by rule of the court of appeals”). The
Fifth and Sixth Circuits also have more than fifteen authorized judgeships but have not
availed themselves of the option Congress permitted in the Omnibus Judgeship Act. See 28
U.S.C. § 44(a).
202. See Circuit Judges: Biographies, U.S. COURTS FOR NINTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ce9.
uscourts.gov/ninthcircuit/circuit_judges.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (listing names of
active duty judges on the court).
203. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3.
204. See id.
205. See Pamela Ann Rymer, The “Limited” En Banc: Half Full, or Half Empty?, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 321 (2006).
206. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (“A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active
service and who are not disqualified may order that an appeal or other proceeding be heard
or reheard by the court of appeals en banc.”).
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could vote to reaffirm the three judge panel decision that fourteen judges
who voted for en banc rehearing would have reversed, thus establishing
Ninth Circuit law that a majority of judges on the Ninth Circuit do not
support.207 The Ninth Circuit’s procedure, however, allows a majority of
the court’s active judges to force a case decided by a limited en banc court
to be reheard by the full court.208 There is no indication that this provision
has ever been invoked.
2. The Federal Circuit’s Unique Amicus Brief Practice
Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure allows for
nongovernmental amicus curiae to file briefs but requires leave of court or
consent of the parties.209 Therefore, except in cases where the court grants
leave in its en banc order, “amici curiae first must file a motion for leave or
go through the process of obtaining consent of the parties before filing a
brief.”210
Many of the Federal Circuit’s en banc orders permit amici curiae to file
briefs and, in some cases, “the Federal Circuit specifically invites . . . the
[Patent and Trademark Office] to file an amicus brief.”211 This is not the
common standard in the other circuits.212 The Federal Circuit’s practice of
inviting amici to file briefs in en banc cases indicates a “stronger attitude of
inclusiveness” than that of the other circuits.213
D. Informal Polling
Informal en banc review is a procedure where one “federal circuit court
panel circulates an opinion to the full court for acquiescence in an action as
a substitute for formal en banc review.”214 Informal en banc processes
usually entail circulating an opinion to the full court with an explanation
that the opinion takes an action that would ordinarily require the court to
convene en banc.215 The opinion includes an “invitation to call for en banc
review.”216 If a majority of the circuit agrees with the panel’s opinion or at
least does not vote to hear the case en banc, the panel opinion is
published.217 The panel opinion will include a notation—either in the text
of the opinion or in a footnote—that the full court approved of the opinion
through informal en banc review.218

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See Rymer, supra note 205, at 321–22.
See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3.
See FED. R. APP. P. 29(a).
See Vacca, supra note 128, at 743.
See id.
See id. at 743–44.
See id. at 744.
See Sloan, supra note 30, at 725.
See id.
See id. at 726.
See id.
See id.
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Nine of the thirteen federal circuits have implemented some sort of mini
or informal en banc review.219 This includes the First, Second, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits.220 These circuits
have used informal en banc review in various types of circumstances
including when a panel addresses a question of first impression, when a
panel creates or continues a circuit split, and even when a panel overrules
circuit precedent.221 Using informal en banc review to overrule circuit
precedent has been criticized for violating the law-of-the-circuit rule and,
thus, undermining horizontal stare decisis.222
Only the Seventh Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have meaningfully
attempted to justify their use of informal en banc review by creating actual
governing procedures. The Seventh Circuit authorizes informal en banc
review by Local Rule 40(e).223 The D.C. Circuit has promulgated a policy
statement governing the use of informal en banc review.224 The remaining
circuits who use informal en banc review regularly—the First, Second,
Fifth, and Tenth Circuits—have not clearly defined when using informal en
banc procedures is appropriate.
1. The Seventh and D.C. Circuits
The Seventh Circuit first used an informal en banc procedure in 1969.225
In 1976, the Seventh Circuit promulgated Local Rule 40(e), which
provides:
A proposed opinion approved by a panel of this court adopting a position
which would overrule a prior decision of this court or create a conflict
between or among circuits shall not be published unless it is first
circulated among the active members of this court and a majority of them
do not vote to rehear en banc the issue of whether the position should be
adopted. In the discretion of the panel, a proposed opinion which would
establish a new rule or procedure may be similarly circulated before it is
issued. When the position is adopted by the panel after compliance with
this procedure, the opinion, when published, shall contain a footnote
worded, depending on the circumstances, in substance as follows: This
opinion has been circulated among all judges of this court in regular

219. See Sloan, supra note 30, at 726–27.
220. See id. The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, however, have rarely used informal
en banc procedures and the Sixth Circuit has only used it once—where the decision was later
overturned. Id. at 729. The Third Circuit specifically disavows any informal en banc
procedure in its local rules. See 3D CIR. I.O.P. 9.1 (“It is the tradition of this court that the
holding of a panel in a precedential opinion is binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no
subsequent panel overrules the holding in a precedential opinion of a previous panel. Court
en banc consideration is required to do so.”).
221. See Sloan, supra note 30, at 725.
222. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
223. See 7TH CIR. R. 40(e).
224. See generally Policy Statement on En Banc Endorsement of Panel Decisions, U.S.
CT. APPEALS D.C. CIRCUIT (Jan. 17, 1996), http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/
home.nsf/Content/VL%20-%20RPP%20-%20Irons%20Footnote/$FILE/IRONS.PDF.
225. See United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 934 n.5 (7th Cir. 1969).
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active service. (No judge favored, or A majority did not favor) a rehearing
en banc on the question of (e.g., overruling Doe v. Roe.).226

The cases that employ the Seventh Circuit’s informal en banc procedure do
not explain or justify why it is used; rather, they contain a version of the
footnote required by Rule 40(e) along with a citation to the local rule.227
The D.C. Circuit first used an informal en banc procedure in 1977.228 In
Irons v. Diamond,229 decided four years later, the D.C. Circuit formalized
the use of informal en banc review. The Court, faced with two inconsistent
decisions, overruled one decision and, in doing so, stated in a footnote:
“The foregoing part of the division’s decision, because it resolves an
apparent conflict between two prior decisions, has been separately
considered and approved by the full court, and thus constitutes the law of
the circuit.”230
Since then, the D.C. Circuit began using the “so-called Irons footnote[]”
in cases that would ordinarily require en banc review.231 The circuit
expanded the range of justifications for using the Irons footnote procedure,
including: to extend or limit earlier panel decisions,232 to reject dicta,233
and to overrule decisions deemed incorrect.234
On January 17, 1996, in an apparent attempt to standardize the use of the
Irons footnote procedure, the D.C. Circuit promulgated a “Policy Statement
on En Banc Endorsement of Panel Decisions” indentifying the types of
cases where the Irons footnote procedure was acceptable.235 The policy
statement expressly acknowledges that the procedure is a substitute for
formal en banc review and may be called for when “the circumstances of
the case or the importance of the legal questions presented do not warrant
the heavy administrative burdens of full en banc hearing.”236 The policy
statement notes the type of cases where the informal en banc procedure is
appropriate:
(1) resolving an apparent conflict in the prior decisions of panels of the
court;
(2) rejecting a prior statement of law which, although arguably dictum,
warrants express rejection to avoid future confusion;

226. 7TH CIR. R. 40(e).
227. See, e.g., Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 942 n.7 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712, 718 n.2 (7th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1097
(2005); Gibson v. West, 201 F.3d 990, 994 n.3 (7th Cir. 2000).
228. See United States v. Sheppard, 569 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
229. 670 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
230. See id. at 268 n.11.
231. See Sloan, supra note 30, at 735.
232. See Londrigan v. FBI, 722 F.2d 840, 844–45 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
233. See U.S. Dep’t of Navy v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 952 F.2d 1434, 1439 n.5
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
234. See In re Sealed Case No. 97-3112, 181 F.3d 128, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(Henderson, J., concurring).
235. See Policy Statement on En Banc Endorsement of Panel Decisions, supra note 224.
236. See id.
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(3) overruling an old or obsolete decision which, although still
technically valid as precedent, has plainly been rendered obsolete by
subsequent legislation or other developments; and
(4) overruling a more recent precedent which, due to an intervening
Supreme Court decision, or the combined weight of authority from other
circuits, a panel is convinced is clearly an incorrect statement of current
law.237

The D.C. Circuit is the only circuit to explicitly state that it uses the
informal en banc procedure in cases where formal en banc review is
appropriate, but not important enough to be granted.238 It is also the only
circuit to articulate specific guidelines governing the informal en banc
procedure’s application.239
2. The First, Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits
The informal en banc procedures of the First, Second, Fifth, and Tenth
Circuits are purely a product of case law.
The First Circuit first used an informal en banc procedure in 1990.240 In
Gallagher v. Wilton Enterprises,241 decided two years later, the First Circuit
attempted to justify the use of informal en banc review in a footnote:
Because this case required us to reexamine [an earlier circuit precedent],
we would ordinarily have convened the en banc court. We have,
however, in rare instances, where it has become reasonably clear that a
prior precedent of this court was erroneously decided or is no longer good
law, achieved the same result more informally by circulating the proposed
panel opinion to all the active judges of the court for pre-publication
comment. While this practice is to be used sparingly and with extreme
caution, we have employed it in the special circumstances of this case,
with the result that the entire court has approved the overruling of [the
earlier circuit precedent] on the point at issue.242

The First Circuit frequently cites Gallagher as a justification for
implementing informal en banc review.243
The Second Circuit first used an informal en banc procedure in 1966.244
Since then, the Second Circuit has used the procedure regularly.245 While
237. Id.
238. See Sloan, supra note 30, at 736.
239. See id. at 745.
240. See United States v. Bucuvalas, 909 F.2d 593 (1st Cir. 1990).
241. 962 F.2d 120 (1st Cir. 1992).
242. Id. at 124 n.4 (citation omitted).
243. See, e.g., Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61, 67 n.2
(1st Cir. 2004); Crowe v. Bolduc, 365 F.3d 86, 89 n.1 (1st Cir. 2004).
244. See United States v. Malafronte, 357 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v.
Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
245. See, e.g., Shipping Corp. of India v. Jaldhi Overseas PTE, 585 F.3d 58, 67 (2d Cir.
2009) (“We readily acknowledge that a panel of our Court is ‘bound by the decisions of prior
panels until such time as they are overruled either by an en banc panel of our Court or by the
Supreme Court,’ and thus that it would ordinarily be neither appropriate nor possible for us
to reverse an existing Circuit precedent. In this case, however, we have circulated this
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many opinions state that they have been circulated to all active members of
the court, no case has established “the procedure or its acceptable uses.”246
The Fifth Circuit first used an informal en banc procedure in 1984, in
Affholder, Inc. v. Southern Rock, Inc.247 In Affholder, Inc., the Fifth Circuit
attempted to justify the use of the informal en banc procedure:
Mindful of the law of the circuit rule, which forbids one panel to overrule
another save when a later statute or Supreme Court decision has changed
the applicable law, this opinion has been considered not only by all
members of the panels in those [opinions that have been overruled] but
also by all judges in active service who were not members of those
. . . panels.248

Since Affholder, Inc., the Fifth Circuit has noted its policy of treating
informal circulation of an opinion as equivalent to formal en banc
review.249
The Tenth Circuit first used an informal en banc procedure in 1984.250
Since then, the Tenth Circuit has regularly implemented informal en banc
review. While opinions that use the informal en banc procedure note that
the opinion was circulated because it overrules prior decisions and that all
or a majority of the judges agreed with the disposition on the particular
question of law, no case has established the procedure for its use or its
acceptable uses.251
3. Critiquing Informal En Banc Review
A major question is whether informal en banc procedures are fair. While
the Supreme Court has not commented on informal en banc processes, at
least one scholar has argued that use of informal en banc review creates
several problems, including that it may (1) undermine the principle of
horizontal stare decisis, (2) create potential negative effects on traditionally
marginalized groups, (3) diminish collegiality on the court, (4) reduce
meaningful opportunities for parties to participate in the process, (5) create
uncertainty about the weight of informal en banc opinions, or (6) allow full
endorsement of opinions based on less than thorough review.252
Judge Karen L. Henderson, of the D.C. Circuit, argues that the D.C.
Circuit’s informal en banc procedure—the “Irons Footnote”—has “serious
flaws.”253 This is because it does not have “any of the safeguards or

opinion to all active members of this Court prior to filing and have received no objection.”
(quoting United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004))).
246. See Sloan, supra note 30, at 730–31.
247. 746 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1984).
248. Id. at 311.
249. See Sloan, supra note 30, at 731–32.
250. See EEOC v. Gaddis, 733 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1984).
251. See Sloan, supra note 30, at 734.
252. See id. at 744–45. For a more detailed discussion of the arguments made against
using informal en banc review, see id. at 744–64.
253. See In re Sealed Case No. 97-3112, 181 F.3d 128, 146 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(Henderson, J., concurring).
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formalities attending the en banc process.”254 Judge Henderson further
argues that allowing a three-judge panel to decide a question that would
normally require full court consideration without the full court having the
benefit of further briefing or argument is not consistent with “[r]easoned
decisionmaking and stare decisis.”255 Due to the informal en banc process,
parties do not have the opportunity to rebrief or reargue the case.256 Rather,
the decision is based on the panel’s proposed opinion and whatever
justification the panel provides.257
III. THE BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF EN BANC REVIEW
Both advocates and critics of en banc review recognize that advantages
and disadvantages accompany having a circuit court hear and rehear cases
en banc. To determine why there is such a discrepancy in the use of the en
banc procedure in the various circuits, it is helpful to understand the policy
implications of using en banc review.
This Part outlines the positive and negative aspects of the formal en banc
procedure. Part III.A summarizes the key arguments made for promoting
the en banc process. Part III.B summarizes the criticisms and disadvantages
of the en banc process.
A. The Benefits of En Banc Review
There are many important reasons for a circuit to convene en banc. For
instance, a “rehearing en banc allows the full court to maintain consistency
in the case law—intracircuit, intercircuit, or between the circuit and the
Supreme Court.”258 It allows the full court to address issues of great
importance.259 And it is the sole means by which the court as a whole can
ensure that decisions by its panels are in line with circuit preferences.260
In United States v. American-Foreign Steamship Corp.,261 the Supreme
Court outlined many of the advantages of en banc proceedings. First,
because en banc courts “are convened only when extraordinary
circumstances exist,” they make “for more effective judicial administration”
where “[c]onflicts within a circuit will be avoided” and “[f]inality of
decision in the circuit courts of appeal will be promoted.”262 These
considerations are important because in the existing “federal judicial system
[the courts of appeals] are the courts of last resort in the run of ordinary
cases.”263

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 140, at 1022–23.
See id. at 1023.
See id.
363 U.S. 685 (1960).
Id. at 689.
Id. (quoting Textile Mills Corp. v. Comm’r, 314 U.S. 326, 334–35 (1941)).
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Second, because not every case is one where “extraordinary
circumstances exist,” the en banc procedure does not replace the traditional
practice of having three-judge panels hear and decide cases where there is
no conflict within the circuit and, thus, the en banc procedure is not a waste
of time and judicial resources.264
Third, en banc decisions presumably represent the court’s collective
judgment and secure uniformity in the circuit because all the active circuit
judges have the opportunity to determine the “major doctrinal trends of the
future for their court.”265
Scholars have advanced other arguments for promoting the use of en
banc review. A serious advantage is that, although they are not binding on
other circuits, en banc decisions may exert greater persuasive influence on
other circuits.266 The Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, for example, have
verified that this is often true.267
Having the courts of appeals sit en banc may also be helpful to the
Supreme Court.268 First, “[f]or cases in which the justices would be likely
to be asked to consider a panel’s ruling, an en banc hearing might resolve
the case and make Supreme Court review unnecessary.”269 Second, for
those en banc cases of which the Supreme Court does grant review, the en
banc decision “would also provide assurance that the doctrinal rule
announced by the courts of appeals was held by a majority of that court’s
judges.”270 And, finally, because en banc rehearings allow more complete
consideration (since more judges are present) and provides perspective not
available to the panel, en banc decisions “present the Supreme Court with a
wider range of interpretation than a three-judge panel would . . . provide,”
which “would make the justices better informed in deciding to grant review
and then in developing their own ruling.”271
The en banc procedure is a useful tool to deal with the agency problem
that results from delegating cases to three judge panels.272 The agency
problem is this: “the members of any given three-judge panel could
potentially be outliers who have different dispositions, biases, and
preferences and do not decide a case in the same way as the full circuit
264. Id. at 689–90.
265. See id. at 690 (quoting United States v. Am.-Foreign S.S. Corp., 265 F.2d 136, 155
(2d Cir. 1958)).
266. See SECOND CIRCUIT COURTS COMM., supra note 25, at 12.
267. See United States v. Cole, 567 F.3d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 2009) (describing a Sixth
Circuit en banc opinion as “thorough” and finding its reasoning “persuasive”); Feit v. Ward,
886 F.2d 848, 854 n.8 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that the court was “particularly persuaded” by
a “unanimous en banc opinion” of the D.C. Circuit); United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d
652, 658 (5th Cir. 1974) (following an Eighth Circuit en banc decision that the court found
“particularly persuasive”).
268. See Stephen L. Wasby, The Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals En Bancs, 33
MCGEORGE L. REV. 17, 30 (2001).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 31.
271. Id.
272. See Tom S. Clark, A Principal-Agent Theory of En Banc Review, 25 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 55, 55–56 (2009).
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would.”273 En banc review, however, allows the full circuit to review
decisions made by three-judge panels.274
Additionally, the en banc process is useful because, due to the
discretionary nature of the Supreme Court’s writ of certiorari, a vast
majority of circuit court decisions are denied review by the Supreme Court
upon further appeal and thus the circuit courts are functionally a “court[] of
last resort” in the majority of cases.275
B. The Negative Aspects of En Banc Review
Critics contend that en banc rehearings are overly time consuming and
inefficient, that they fail to “serve their intended purpose,” and they are “too
often abused for political ends.”276
Judge Irving R. Kaufman, a former Second Circuit judge, criticized the
en banc procedure for being inefficient.277 Because petitions for an en banc
rehearing are routinely filed as a matter of course by counsel, each circuit
receives a very large number of petitions.278
Judge Kaufman argued that the amount of time that it takes to review the
abundance of petitions amounts to a waste of judicial resources.279 From
1981 to 1986, for example, every Second Circuit judge examined over 750
petitions for rehearing en banc, yet the circuit voted in only twenty-seven en
banc polls.280 This increases delays in the court.281
Judge Kaufman argued that these inefficiencies and delays are
heightened when rehearings en banc are actually granted which, in turn,
burden the judiciary and the litigant—who has to wait even longer for the
final resolution of the case.282 Delays result because the “[e]n banc
opinions must be written and circulated among the members of the en banc
court; invariably they spark a blizzard of memoranda in an effort to forge a

273. Id. at 57.
274. See id.
275. See Textile Mills Corp. v. Comm’r, 314 U.S. 326, 334–35 (1941).
276. See George, supra note 52, at 213.
277. See Kaufman, supra note 31, at 7 (detailing the costs of en banc proceedings and the
burden they place on federal courts). Judge Kaufman was a judge in the Southern District of
New York from 1949 to 1961 and a judge on the Second Circuit from 1961 to 1987. See
History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/
page/tu_rosenberg_bio_judge_kaufman.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
278. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. This view is shared by many circuit court
judges. For example, according to Judge Harry T. Edwards of the D.C. Circuit, getting the
entire court together to hear one case en banc is very costly because it “burdens judges who
already are carrying a large backlog of cases, and it substantially delays the case being
reheard, often with no clear principle emanating from the en banc court.” See Bartlett ex rel.
Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J., concurring). Judge
Edwards was a judge on the D.C. Circuit from 1980 to 2005. See Harry T. Edwards, U.S.
CT. APPEALS D.C. CIRCUIT, http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL++Judges+-+HTE (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
280. Kaufman, supra note 31, at 7.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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consensus.”283 Judge Kaufman emphasized that the delay “occasioned by
the en banc proceeding is startling” because “[t]he interval between oral
argument and en banc disposition is five times as great—on average—as
that for a panel disposition.”284
Judge Kaufman also argued that en banc decisions often lead to
inconsistency.285 This is because an en banc decision frequently “produces
either a majority opinion that was crafted in a purposefully vague manner to
forge a consensus within the court, or a litany of diverging opinions,
injecting a degree of uncertainty into the law.”286 This, he said, “deprives
the judicial process of its quintessential elements of stability and order”
and, thus, splintered en banc decisions often generate more uncertainty.287
Furthermore, Judge Kaufman argued that en banc proceedings threaten
the “institutional integrity of the appellate court and the three-judge
panel.”288 This is because en banc proceedings send the message that
“decisions reached by three-judge panels are not final, but represent merely
one step on an elongated appellate ladder.”289
Other critics have argued that en banc rehearings are often abused for
political ends.290 The argument is that there are ideological motivations
behind the decision to grant en banc review—namely, judges abuse the en
banc process by overturning panel outcomes that are at odds with the
prevailing ideological view of the court.291 This is troublesome because it
intensifies internal conflict on a circuit court, threatens collegiality between
judges, and creates the danger of polarizing courts.292 And “[w]hen
ideological preferences begin to dominate judicial decisionmaking,
polarization and instability result.”293 According to Judge Harry T.
Edwards, collegiality is essential to judicial decisionmaking, and when en
banc review is used to advance ideological ends, it will encourage open
politicking among judges.294 This “[p]oliticking will replace the thoughtful
dialogue that should characterize a court where every judge respects the
integrity of his or her colleagues.”295 Additionally, using en banc review to
advance ideological ends questions the integrity of panel judges “who are
both intelligent enough to know the law and conscientious enough to abide
by their oath to uphold it.”296
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See id. at 8.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. See Christopher P. Banks, The Politics of En Banc Review in the “Mini–Supreme
Court,” 13 J.L. & POL. 377 (1997); Note, supra note 112, at 864.
291. See Note, supra note 112, at 879.
292. See id. at 879–80.
293. See id. at 880.
294. See Bartlett ex rel. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1243–44. Not all commentators and judges, however, agree with the view that
en banc hearings threaten collegiality. For example, Judge Albert B. Maris of the Third
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Another critique is that the en banc procedure is impractical.297 En banc
review was recognized to allow the full court to convene to hear or rehear a
particular case.298 However, larger circuits, like the Ninth Circuit, are
forced to sit as a limited en banc court, where less than the full court meets
to decide a case that normally would be decided by the full court, as an
alternative to engaging in full-blown en banc review.299
Finally, critics point out that the en banc process lacks judicial
transparency. This is because “[t]he public does not know whether a vote
occurs, which judges vote when a vote does occur, which way judges vote,
nor the final count of the votes.”300
IV. REDEFINING EN BANC REVIEW
This Part enunciates a new standard that should be adopted for en banc
review: to obtain en banc review, a judge must request en banc
consideration (i.e., litigants should no longer have the ability to petition for
en banc review) and the judge’s suggestion must be affirmatively voted on
by a lower threshold of the active circuit judges (i.e., the now-required
majority vote of active-duty judges should be reduced).
The current en banc regime is confusing and problematic. Courts and
commentators have suggested a variety of reforms to the en banc procedure.
The first reform, which many circuits use, is some type of informal en banc
procedure.301 These types of procedures are inadequate because they do not
allow litigants to further brief the court and they lack adequate opportunity
for notice and comment.302
It may be beneficial to require all circuits to publish their en banc
procedures, including these types of informal decisionmaking procedures,
in their circuit rules. However, this would not respond to the criticism that
the en banc procedure is time consuming, inefficient, fails to serve its
intended purpose, and is too often abused for political ends.303
In adopting an adequate reform, the litigant’s interest in securing
adequate review of his or her case must be balanced against the need to
preserve limited judicial resources. En banc review provides another
opportunity for a person to obtain a favorable ruling because it gives a
person another chance to have their case heard.304 However, en banc
review is rarely obtained,305 and tightening the standard required to obtain

Circuit wrote that his colleagues on the bench “think that [the en banc] procedure has been
very helpful in maintaining the very high esprit de corps which they enjoy.” See Albert
Branson Maris, Hearing and Rehearing Cases In Banc, 14 F.R.D. 91, 96 (1954).
297. See Banks, supra note 290, at 388.
298. See supra Part I.A.2.
299. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3; see also supra Part II.C.1.
300. See Stecker, supra note 20, at 17.
301. See supra Part II.D.
302. See supra notes 256–62 and accompanying text.
303. See supra Part III.B.
304. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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en banc review would likely not impact the probability of a person
obtaining it.
An extreme structural reform is necessary to respond to the criticisms of
the en banc procedure. The most promising reform would be to no longer
allow a litigant to petition for en banc review and instead only allow the
suggestion to be raised by a judge sua sponte.306 This would directly
respond to the critics’ assertion that the en banc process is an inefficient use
of judicial time,307 and would also free up judicial resources to review
decisions by three-judge panels that are worthy of en banc review.308 As
the Fifth Circuit’s local rules indicate, “frequently [en banc] rehearings
granted result from a request for en banc reconsideration by a judge of the
court rather than a petition by the parties.”309 Thus, since petitions by
litigants are rarely granted the burden on litigants may not be that dramatic.
With en banc petitions no longer being filed as a matter of course by
counsel,310 circuit judges will likely hold in much higher esteem a judge’s
suggestion that a case be reviewed en banc.311 And the requirement that
only a judge may suggest a hearing or rehearing en banc may actually result
in a better selection of cases to receive en banc review because those cases
truly deserving en banc review will no longer be lost among a pile of
routine petitions filed by counsel.312
This reform, however, would require overruling part of the Western
Pacific decision313 where the Supreme Court said that a circuit court must
give a litigant the opportunity to suggest to the court “that a particular case
is appropriate for consideration by all the judges.”314 The benefits that
would be obtained—e.g., freeing up judicial time and resources, decreasing
delays in the disposition of a case, and enhancing judicial transparency
throughout the en banc process315—outweigh the negative impact on the
litigant.
To deal with the enhanced burden on the litigant that would arise by
barring litigants from petitioning for en banc review, the circuits should
adopt an approach where less than a majority of active-duty judge’s votes
are required to garner en banc review.316 This would require amending
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35.317

306. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 277–89 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 268–80 and accompanying text.
309. See 5TH CIR. I.O.P. 35.
310. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
311. See supra Part II.D.
312. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text.
314. See W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 250 (1953).
315. See supra Part III.B.
316. See supra Part I.B.
317. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (“A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active
service and who are not disqualified may order that an appeal or other proceeding be heard
or reheard by the court of appeals en banc.”).
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Some commentators have suggested that Rule 35 should be changed to
require the approval of a supermajority to activate en banc review.318
Commentators suggest that this would “blunt the effects of shifting
majorities voting largely on ideological grounds.”319 This reform should be
rejected because (1) while it may respond to the criticism that en banc
review is too often abused to further political ends, it still does not respond
to the argument that the en banc procedure is an overly time consuming,
inefficient procedure,320 and (2) by requiring the affirmative vote of a
supermajority of active-duty judges there will be a decrease in the total
number of en banc hearings by making it harder to obtain the adequate
number of votes.
The importance of en banc review outweighs the potential for political
abuse—as judges “are both intelligent enough to know the law and
conscientious enough to abide by their oath to uphold it”321—and therefore,
the number of votes required to obtain en banc review should be lessened.
The Supreme Court, for example, only requires the affirmative vote of four
justices to grant certiorari, which is less than a simple majority of the
justices.322 Because the decision to grant en banc review can be as
important as the writ of certiorari it should also require less than a majority
of active-duty judges’ votes.
Therefore, to make the en banc process more efficient, a reform that one,
requires a judge to request en banc consideration rather than a procedure
that allows litigants to petition for en banc review and two, requires a lower
number of votes to activate en banc review, should be adopted.
CONCLUSION
The federal courts of appeals are permitted to sit en banc to hear a case or
rehear a case decided by a three-judge panel. Every circuit has local rules
that permit it to sit en banc and detail its en banc procedure. However, en
banc review is rarely invoked across all the circuits. Critics contend that en
banc review is an inefficient, overly costly procedure that rarely serves its
intended purpose. Despite its downsides, there are certain cases that require
a decision by the full court to resolve panel conflict and to ensure sound
circuit law—like Gregory Wilson’s case, where the Sixth Circuit law time
barring his claim was overturned in a later case. Thus, to minimize the
burden on the courts and to ensure that proper cases are heard en banc a rule
should be adopted where judges may call for an en banc hearing or
rehearing sua sponte, but litigants are precluded from petitioning for en
banc review. Additionally, to determine whether a certain case should be
heard en banc, the number of votes needed should be less than a majority of
all active-duty judges on the circuit court.
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